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ABSTRACT 
 
Various factors affect conservative accounting of corporations. Most of all, this paper focuses on the factor of 
corporate capital raising. One of the important roles of conservatism is that companies conduct conservative 
accounting to cut the agency costs due to information asymmetry. Managers may desire excellent management 
performance and stable financial condition. Depending on circumstances, they seek to improve management 
performance and financial condition by choosing a proper accounting method. That is, they have incentives to carry 
out less conservative accounting. Companies that raise capital may have stronger incentives to take such an 
accounting method. On the contrary, if a capital market monitoring system works properly, corporations would 
conduct conservative accounting to reduce the agency costs. The results of the empirical analysis reveals that the 
Korean listed companies raising capital choose less conservative accounting than those that do not raise capital. This 
indicates companies without financing conduct conservative accounting more than those with. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
apital raising is one of the three major activities of corporations and is a very important activity for 
corporations. Corporations issue stocks or corporate bonds to raise capital directly in the capital market, 
or they raise capital through borrowing from financial institutions such as banks. The financial statements 
of the corporations are significantly affected by capital raising. In addition, managers have a lot of incentives from the 
accounting and economic perspectives in raising capital (Teoh, Welch & Wong, 1998a; 1998b; Rangan, 1998). 
 
Conservatism, one of the important principles in company accounting, is a method of recognizing assets and revenues 
as low or as late as possible while debts and expenses as high or as quick as possible. Many companies including 
Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd. in the engineer-to-order industry have recently stirred up social 
issues because they have failed to abide by this underlying principle (Hyun, Han & Lee, 2016). Major fraud accounting 
cases, such as Enron, WorldCom and SK Global, remind about the importance of conservatism principle that firms 
need to observe (Healy & Palepu, 2003; Zekany, Braun & Warder, 2004; Choi, Lee, Choi & Ahn, 2015).  
 
Watts (2003a; 2003b) argued the association between agency costs and accounting conservatism. In a situation where 
ownership and management are separated, accounting conservatism protects investors by monitoring managers. In 
previous studies, the role of accounting conservatism has been claimed to be the protection of shareholders and 
creditors. In this way, corporations are known to conduct conservative accounting to cut agency costs due to 
asymmetric information. However, this is not the only factor that affects such accounting. This study, above all, 
focuses on corporate capital raising. Capital raising companies are said to have incentives to manage earnings upward 
(Hong, 2016; Hong & Lee, 2016; Hong, 2017). If they make an upward earnings management, they are highly likely 
to carry out non-conservative accounting. If the monitoring system works well in the Korean capital market, the capital 
raising corporation will conduct conservatism accounting. On the other hand, if the monitoring system does not work 
well in the Korean capital market, the capital raising corporation will conduct less conservative accounting. This paper 
compares and analyzes accounting conservatism of companies that raise capital and those that do not. 
 
The academic contribution of this paper is to verify the accounting conservatism of capital-raising corporations. 
Although there have been many studies on the accounting conservatism, there are no studies that have clarified the 
C 
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accounting conservatism of capital-raising corporations. The practical contributions of this paper are as follows. First, 
for external audits of capital-raising corporations, auditors need to examine thoroughly in case they conduct less 
conservative accounting. Second, regulators should consider to strengthen regulations and thoroughly supervise the 
financial reporting of capital-raising corporations. Third, investors should be more careful when investing in stocks 
or bonds considering that the numbers in the financial statements of the company may not be conservative. 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) defined “An accounting choice is any decision that affects the output of the accounting 
system in a particular way in terms of format or substance. This decision encompasses not only financial statements 
prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), but also tax returns and reporting to 
regulatory authorities.” Earnings management and conservatism are representative issues related to accounting choice 
(Kwon, Kim, Sohn, Choi & Han, 2010). 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986) argued the positive accounting theory that political costs, bonus schemes, debt 
contracts can have impacts on a company's accounting method. In general, companies with higher debt ratio, lower 
interest coverage ratio and lower current ratio can encounter higher interest expenses as well as pressures of debt 
redemption. According to debt contracts hypothesis, companies choose the accounting method that recognizes future 
earnings in advance or increases earnings to avoid pressures from debt contracts violations. Since Dhaliwal (1980) 
verified this debt contracts hypothesis, many studies have been reporting the consistent results with the hypothesis. 
 
Basu (1997) defined “Conservatism as resulting in earnings reflecting bad news more quickly than good news”. The 
definition implies that there are systematic differences in the timeliness and persistence of earnings between good 
news and bad news. Basu used stock returns to measure conservatism, and found that the positive changes in earnings 
are more persistent than the negative changes in earnings. Earnings response coefficients (ERCs) of positive changes 
in earnings were greater than ERCs of negative changes in earnings, and these results are consistent with the 
asymmetric persistence of earnings. 
 
Kim and Bae (2006) also examined the relationship between conservatism and factors such as debt ratio, loan ratio, 
institutional investors' shareholding ratio, foreign investors' shareholding ratio and a state of being listed in the stock 
market. They argued that corporations with higher debt ratio, lower loan ratio, higher foreign investors' shareholding 
ratio, and listed companies tend to carry out conservative accounting. 
 
Beatty, Weber and Yu (2008) though displaying no different views on the effects of conservatism, argued that the 
level of conservatism on financial reporting varies according to economic demands. 
 
Kim and Bae (2009) investigated the relationship between conservatism and accruals by measuring the conservatism 
using earnings persistence model and stock returns model of Basu (1997), Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model, and 
Penman and Zhang (2002) model. Kim and Bae separated the accruals as non-discretionary accruals and discretionary 
accruals to verify their relationship with conservatism. Kim and Bae (2009) argued that conservatism is negatively 
related to both non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. Kim and Bae (2009) claimed that accruals 
decreased due to the conservative accounting of the company. Kim and Bae (2009) also examined the effects of non-
discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals on conservatism. It came out the companies with large discretionary 
accruals do conservative accounting. This result is contrary to the assumption in previous researches that claim the 
companies with large discretionary accruals conduct non-conservative accounting. 
 
Hong and Oh (2016) conducted a study on accounting conservatism in terms of debt characteristics. The results of 
comparison between companies raising capital by bank loans and those issuing bonds showed that the former conducts 
more conservative accounting than the latter. These results can be viewed as a poor management of capital market 
participants in monitoring. 
 
Hong (2016) and Hong and Lee (2016) studied on earnings management by companies raising capital. They argued 
that companies issuing equity manage earnings upward more than those issuing bonds. In addition to this, they also 
stated that those issuing bonds make an upward earnings management more than those that do not raise capital and 
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those issuing equity upward earnings management more than those without financing. In other words, capital-raising 
companies make an upward earnings management more than those that do not raise capital at all. 
 
In conclusion, the abovementioned studies have reported that capital-raising companies seek to manage earnings 
upward in order to easily finance capital, reduce costs of raising capital, and to meet the requirements of debt contracts. 
However, the capital market's watchdog system appears to hardly function. According to the definition of 
conservatism, upward earnings management can be viewed as less conservative accounting. Consequently, the 
following hypothesis is set up and verify through empirical analysis in this.  
 
Hypothesis: The capital-raising corporations would carry out less conservative accounting than non-capital raising 
corporations. 
 
THE MODEL 
 
Basu (1997) measured the degree of conservatism depending on how strong a relation between variations in the net 
losses during the previous term and during the current term is comparing with a relation between variations in the net 
earnings during the previous term and during the current term. He considered reflecting losses rather than earnings 
immediately as conservatism, and larger variations in the net losses than variations in the net earnings as a higher 
degree of conservatism. It is referred to as earnings persistence model, and its details are as follows: In formula (1), if 
a coefficient 𝛽" which represents conservatism is significant negative, it means firms that do not raise capital carry 
out conservative accounting more than those that do. 
 ∆𝑁𝐼& = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝐷∆𝑁𝐼&,* + 𝛽-∆𝑁𝐼&,* + 𝛽.𝐷∆𝑁𝐼&,* ∗ ∆𝑁𝐼&,* + 𝛽0𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽3𝐷∆𝑁𝐼&,* ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& 	+𝛽5∆𝑁𝐼&,* ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽"𝐷∆𝑁𝐼&,* ∗ ∆𝑁𝐼&,* ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝜀&	 (1) 
 
Where:  
 ∆𝑁𝐼 =  Change of net income scaled by beginning total asset = (𝑁𝑒𝑡	𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒& − 𝑁𝑒𝑡	𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒&,*)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡&,*   𝐷∆𝑁𝐼 =  1 if ∆𝑁𝐼 is negative, otherwise 0 𝑁𝐹𝐶 =  1 if the firm did not raise capital, otherwise 0 𝜀 =  residuals 
 
Stock returns model of Basu (1997) is a representative measure of conservatism. Basu (1997) stated conservatism to 
recognize the bad news immediately and not to recognize the good news until it is realized. Stock returns would 
decrease if losses due to bad news are reflected immediately. Consequently, a negative stock returns would be more 
closely correlated with net earnings than a positive stock returns. Based on these ideas, the model to measure 
conservatism has been designed as follows: In formula (2), if a coefficient 𝛽" is significant positive, it suggests non-
capital raising companies to carry out conservative accounting more than those raising capital. 
 𝑋𝑃& = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝐷𝑅& + 𝛽-𝑅𝐸𝑇& + 𝛽.𝐷𝑅& ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇& + 𝛽0𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽3𝐷𝑅& ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑇& ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽"𝐷𝑅& ∗𝑅𝐸𝑇& ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝜀&				 (2) 
 
Where:  
 𝑋𝑃 =  Net income scaled by beginning market value = 𝑁𝑒𝑡	𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒&/	𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑒&,* 𝑅𝐸𝑇 =  Buy and hold return from April of this year to March of next year1 𝐷𝑅 =  1 if 𝑅𝐸𝑇 is negative, otherwise 0 
  
																																								 																				
1	The financial statements of South Korean companies are disclosed at the end of March. In the accounting conservatism studies of South Korean 
companies using Basu’s Stock returns model, ‘buy and hold return from April of this year to March of next year’ is used as the stock returns (Kim, 
Yang & Cho, 2011; Nam, Son & Kim, 2013; Lee, Han & Kim, 2015; Hong & Oh, 2016). 
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Givoly and Hayn (2000) measured conservatism by using non-operating accruals. The below formula (3) indicates 
that a significant negative coefficient 𝛽* represents higher conservatism (Lafond & Watts, 2008). 
 𝐺𝐻𝐴𝐶& = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽-𝐺𝐻𝐴𝐶&,* + 𝛽.𝑂𝐶𝐹& + 𝛽0𝐿𝐸𝑉& + 𝛽3𝑀𝑉& + 𝛽5𝐵𝑀& + 𝜀&																							 (3)	2 
 
Where:  
 𝐺𝐻𝐴𝐶 =  Nonoperating accruals scaled by beginning total asset 
 = [𝑁𝑒𝑡	𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒& + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒& − 𝑂𝐶𝐹& − {(∆𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠	𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒& + ∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠&  +∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑	𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠&) − (∆𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠	𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒& + ∆𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠	𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒&)}]/	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡&,* 𝑂𝐶𝐹 =  Cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total asset 𝐿𝐸𝑉 =  Leverage = Debt ratio = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦&/	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡& 𝑀𝑉 =  Natural logarithm of market value = 𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒&) 𝐵𝑀 =  Book to market ratio = 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒&/	𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒& 
 
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) examined the degree of conservatism by analyzing the relationship between total accruals 
and operating cash flows. The relationship between the two is determined by how the good news or the bad news is 
recognized in operating cash flows. When profits and losses are asymmetrically recognized and the bad news cause 
losses, the relation of total accruals and operating cash flows is positive, which suggests conservatism. Such a 
significant positive coefficient 𝛽" in the below formula (4) reveals that corporations which do not raise capital carry 
out conservative accounting more than those which do. 
 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶& = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑂𝐶𝐹& + 𝛽-𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐹& + 𝛽.𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽0𝑂𝐶𝐹& ∗ 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐹& + 𝛽3𝑂𝐶𝐹& ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽5𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐹& ∗𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽"𝑂𝐶𝐹& ∗ 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐹& ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽`𝐺𝑊& + 𝛽b𝑃𝑃𝐸& + 𝜀&									 (4) 
 
Where:  
 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  Total accruals scaled by beginning total asset = (𝑁𝑒𝑡	𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒& − 𝑂𝐶𝐹&)	/	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡&,* 𝑂𝐶𝐹 =  Cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total asset 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐹 = 1 if 𝑂𝐶𝐹 is negative, otherwise 0 𝐺𝑊 =  Sales growth rate scaled by beginning total asset = (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑠& − 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑠&,*)/	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡&,* 𝑃𝑃𝐸 =  Property, plant and equipment scaled by beginning total asset 
 
 
Khan and Watts (2009) expanded stock returns model of Basu (1997) to develop a conservatism measure, called 
CSCORE. To reduce statistical deviation in this study, a hundred group of CSCORE was formed, each value assigned 
to each group (0-99), and then figures gained by dividing such a value by 100 used. If CSCORE is closer to 1, 
conservatism is stronger. If a coefficient 𝛽* of the following formula (5) is significant positive, it suggests non-capital 
raising firms conduct conservative accounting more than those raising capital. 
 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸& = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽-𝑀𝑉& + 𝛽.𝐿𝐸𝑉& + 𝛽0𝑂𝐶𝐹& + 𝛽3𝑀𝐵& + 𝛽5𝐺𝑊& + 𝛴𝑌𝐷 + 𝛴𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀& (5)	3 
 
Where:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 =  Measurement of conservatism developed by Khan and Watts (2009) 𝑌𝐷 =  Year dummy variables 𝐼𝑁𝐷 =  Industry dummy variables 
 
																																								 																				
2 This model included control variables which is commonly used in many previous studies such as Paek and Yoo (2010); Kim et al. (2011); Nam 
et al. (2013); Gong and Baek (2016); Hong and Oh (2016). 
3 This model included control variables which is commonly used in many previous studies such as Kim and Park (2014); Choi and Bae (2015); 
Choi et al. (2015); Ryu and Kim (2015); Hong and Oh (2016). 
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Refer to Model (1), (3) and (4) for the definition of other variables. 
 
This study is conducted by using samples of corporations listed from 1991 to 2014 in Korea Exchange (KRX) KOSPI 
market. Companies that provide financial services or do not adopt fiscal month of December are excluded due to 
incomparability. KOSDAQ companies with the possibility of unusual samples were also excluded. In addition, only 
companies that increase capital by issuing equity or bonds, among all other capital-raising companies, are included in 
the samples. To adjust extreme values, the top 1% and bottom 1% of data are winsorized. The final samples selected 
are 10,650. The financial data are collected from Total Solution 2000 (TS-2000) of the Korea Listed Companies 
Association (KLCA), stock price data from FN-Guide's Data-Guide, data for seasoned equity offerings from Korea 
Investor’s Network for Disclosure System (KIND) of KRX, and data for issuing bonds from Edaily's BONDWEB 
system. Table 1 shows the process of sample selection and Table 2 shows the sample distribution by year and industry. 
 
 
Table 1. Sample selection procedures 
Sample selection criteria Sample size 
KOSPI companies listed in the KRX between 1991 and 2014 12,618 
(-) Financial companies (811) 
(-) Companies with fiscal year not ending in December (327) 
(-) Companies with missing financial data (830) 
Final samples 10,650 
 
 
Table 2. Sample distribution 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1991 22 13 14 36 20 7 11 24 16 17 
1992 23 15 15 37 22 7 12 25 17 19 
1993 24 15 16 39 21 8 13 25 18 20 
1994 24 15 16 39 21 8 14 25 18 20 
1995 24 15 16 40 21 7 15 25 18 21 
1996 25 17 16 41 22 8 15 26 18 22 
1997 23 19 19 43 19 8 15 28 19 20 
1998 24 20 19 43 20 10 15 27 25 23 
1999 24 20 21 45 21 12 15 27 26 24 
2000 25 20 21 45 24 12 15 30 27 24 
2001 27 20 22 47 24 13 16 31 27 28 
2002 27 20 22 47 24 13 17 31 27 29 
2003 27 20 22 49 25 14 17 31 28 30 
2004 28 20 22 50 27 14 17 34 31 32 
2005 28 20 23 52 28 14 17 36 32 33 
2006 29 20 23 54 28 14 17 37 33 34 
2007 29 21 25 55 28 15 18 38 33 35 
2008 29 23 26 59 28 15 18 40 35 36 
2009 30 23 26 59 28 15 18 41 36 36 
2010 30 24 26 59 30 15 18 45 37 40 
2011 31 25 27 60 30 16 19 46 37 41 
2012 32 25 27 61 32 17 19 48 39 42 
2013 34 25 28 64 32 17 19 49 41 43 
2014 35 25 28 67 32 19 19 49 41 43 
Total 654 480 520 1,191 607 298 389 818 679 712 
(Table 2 continued on next page) 
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(Table 2 continued) 
Year (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 𝑵𝑭𝑪𝒕=0 𝑵𝑭𝑪𝒕=1 Total 
1991 19 17 24 12 3 30 11 86 210 296 
1992 21 18 25 12 3 31 11 94 219 313 
1993 23 18 27 12 3 31 11 133 191 324 
1994 23 18 26 13 3 31 11 184 141 325 
1995 23 18 27 13 3 31 12 209 120 329 
1996 27 19 27 13 3 32 11 226 116 342 
1997 27 19 27 14 3 33 11 199 148 347 
1998 25 21 27 14 3 33 16 186 179 365 
1999 27 21 29 14 3 34 21 190 194 384 
2000 27 21 30 14 4 36 22 97 300 397 
2001 29 23 32 14 4 39 24 118 302 420 
2002 30 24 33 14 4 40 25 115 312 427 
2003 31 25 34 14 4 41 26 106 332 438 
2004 33 26 38 14 5 42 26 110 349 459 
2005 33 26 38 14 6 45 29 98 376 474 
2006 35 26 39 14 7 47 31 77 411 488 
2007 36 27 39 16 7 48 32 114 388 502 
2008 37 27 41 16 7 50 35 107 415 522 
2009 38 29 41 18 7 52 37 140 394 534 
2010 38 29 42 19 9 55 38 137 417 554 
2011 38 30 44 20 9 55 42 130 440 570 
2012 39 30 50 20 10 57 48 148 448 596 
2013 42 30 55 21 11 57 50 127 491 618 
2014 43 30 55 21 12 56 51 132 494 626 
Total 744 572 850 366 133 1,006 631 3,177 7,473 10650 
(1) = Food, Beverage; (2) = Textile, Clothes, Leather; (3) = Lumber, Pulp, Paper, Furniture; (4) = Cokes, Chemical products; (5) = Medical, 
Pharmaceuticals; (6) = Rubber, Plastic; (7) = Nonmetallic products; (8) = Metal, Fabricated metal; (9) = Computer, Medical manufacturing; (10) = 
Machinery, Electronic equipment; (11) = Motor, Trailers; (12) = Construction; (13) = Wholesaler, Retailer; (14) = Transportation service; (15) = 
Publishing, Broadcasting, Video, Communication; (16) = Professional service; (17) = Others 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of variables. The mean value of NFC is 0.702, which means that 7,473 
(=10,650*0.702) corporations have not raised capital and 3,177 (=10,650-7,473) corporations have raised capital. The 
mean value of TACC is -0.022, and the median value is -0.004. The mean value of XP is 0.059, and the median value 
is 0.070. The mean value of NI is 0.025, and the median value is 0.027. The mean value of ΔNI is 0.004, and the 
median value is 0.001. The mean value of RET is 0.150, and the median value is 0.004. The mean value of GHAC is 
-0.034, and the median value is -0.030. The mean value of CSCORE is 0.497, and the median value is 0.500. Most 
statistical values of variables are not significantly different from the results of previous studies. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Sample size Mean Std. Min Median Max 𝑁𝐹𝐶& 10,650 0.702 0.458 0.000 1.000 1.000 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶& 10,650 -0.022 0.121 -0.664 -0.004 0.406 𝑋𝑃& 10,650 0.059 0.395 -2.075 0.070 1.552 𝑁𝐼& 10,650 0.025 0.081 -0.333 0.027 0.243 ∆𝑁𝐼&,* 10,650 0.004 0.084 -0.333 0.001 0.390 𝑅𝐸𝑇& 10,650 0.150 0.676 -0.843 0.004 3.427 𝑂𝐶𝐹& 10,650 0.050 0.085 -0.203 0.048 0.304 𝐺𝑊& 10,650 0.065 0.209 -0.688 0.051 0.895 𝑃𝑃𝐸& 10,650 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.015 𝐺𝐻𝐴𝐶& 10,650 -0.034 0.080 -0.342 -0.030 0.243 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸& 10,650 0.497 0.287 0.000 0.500 0.990 𝐿𝐸𝑉& 10,650 0.524 0.226 0.054 0.532 0.999 𝑀𝑉& 10,650 18.347 1.664 15.374 18.051 23.363 𝑀𝐵& 10,650 1.009 0.879 0.019 0.771 5.660 𝑁𝐹𝐶 = 1 if the firm did not raise capital, otherwise 0 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 = total accruals scaled by beginning total asset 𝑋𝑃 = net income scaled by beginning market value 𝑁𝐼 = net income scaled by beginning total asset ∆𝑁𝐼 = change of net income scaled by beginning total asset 𝑅𝐸𝑇 = buy and hold return from April of this year to March of next year 𝑂𝐶𝐹 = cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total asset 𝐺𝑊 = sales growth rate scaled by beginning total asset 𝑃𝑃𝐸	= property, plant and equipment scaled by beginning total asset 𝐺𝐻𝐴𝐶 = Non-operating accruals scaled by beginning total asset 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = measurement of conservatism developed by Khan and Watts (2009) 𝐿𝐸𝑉	= debt ratio 𝑀𝑉 = natural logarithm of market value 𝑀𝐵 = Book to market ratio 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation matrix 
Panel A: Earnings Persistence Model of Basu (1997) 
Variables 𝑵𝑭𝑪𝒕 ∆𝑵𝑰𝒕 𝑫∆𝑵𝑰𝒕,𝟏 ∆𝑵𝑰𝒕,𝟏 𝑁𝐹𝐶& 1.000 - - - ∆𝑁𝐼& -0.009 1.000 - - 𝐷∆𝑁𝐼&,* 0.006 0.057*** 1.000 - ∆𝑁𝐼&,* 0.006 -0.161*** -0.549*** 1.000 
 
Panel B: Stock Returns Model of Basu (1997) 
Variables 𝑵𝑭𝑪𝒕 𝑿𝑷𝒕 𝑫𝑹𝒕 𝑹𝑬𝑻𝒕 𝑁𝐹𝐶& 1.000 - - - 𝑋𝑃& -0.015 1.000 - - 𝐷𝑅& -0.012 -0.024 1.000 - 𝑅𝐸𝑇& -0.031*** 0.066*** -0.651*** 1.000 
 
Panel C: Givoly and Hayn Model (2000) 
Variables 𝑵𝑭𝑪𝒕 𝑮𝑯𝑨𝑪𝒕 𝑮𝑯𝑨𝑪𝒕,𝟏 𝑶𝑪𝑭𝒕 𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒕 𝑴𝑽𝒕 𝑩𝑴𝒕 𝑁𝐹𝐶& 1.000 - - - - -  𝐺𝐻𝐴𝐶& 0.005 1.000 - - - - - 𝐺𝐻𝐴𝐶&,* 0.060*** 0.147*** 1.000 - - - - 𝑂𝐶𝐹& 0.138*** -0.261*** -0.140*** 1.000 - - - 𝐿𝐸𝑉& -0.296*** -0.252*** -0.164*** -0.140*** 1.000 - - 𝑀𝑉& -0.214*** 0.086*** 0.053*** 0.179*** -0.136*** 1.000 - 𝐵𝑀& 0.037*** 0.108*** 0.051*** -0.016 -0.139*** -0.310*** 1.000 
 
Panel D: Ball and Shivakumar Model (2008) 
Variables 𝑵𝑭𝑪𝒕 𝑻𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕 𝑶𝑪𝑭𝒕 𝑫𝑶𝑪𝑭𝒕 𝑮𝑾𝒕 𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒕 𝑁𝐹𝐶& 1.000 - - - - - 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶& -0.060*** 1.000 - - - - 𝑂𝐶𝐹& 0.138*** -0.312*** 1.000 - - - 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐹& -0.112*** 0.200*** -0.610*** 1.000 - - 𝐺𝑊& 0.011 0.030*** 0.126*** -0.039*** 1.000 - 𝑃𝑃𝐸& 0.105*** -0.262*** -0.023** 0.050*** 0.119*** 1.000 
 
Panel E: Khan and Watts Model (2009) 
Variables 𝑵𝑭𝑪𝒕 𝑪𝑺𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑬𝒕 𝑴𝑩𝒕 𝑶𝑪𝑭𝒕 𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒕 𝑴𝑽𝒕 𝑮𝑾𝒕 𝑁𝐹𝐶& 1.000 - - - - -  𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸& 0.051*** 1.000 - - - - - 𝑀𝐵& -0.086*** 0.005 1.000 - - - - 𝑂𝐶𝐹& 0.138*** -0.020 0.015 1.000 - - - 𝐿𝐸𝑉& -0.296*** 0.126*** 0.082*** -0.140*** 1.000 - - 𝑀𝑉& -0.214*** 0.081*** 0.337*** 0.179*** -0.136*** 1.000 - 𝐺𝑊& 0.011 0.060*** 0.035*** 0.126*** 0.271*** -0.017* 1.000 
1) Refer to Table 3 for the definition of variables. 
2) ***, **, and * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A, B, C, D, and E in Table 4 show the Pearson correlation matrix between the variables in each research model. 
The correlation coefficients between variables in each model are not significantly different from the results of previous 
researches. 
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Table 5. Regression Analysis by Earnings Persistence Model of Basu (1997) ∆𝑁𝐼& = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝐷∆𝑁𝐼&,* + 𝛽-∆𝑁𝐼&,* + 𝛽.𝐷∆𝑁𝐼&,* ∗ ∆𝑁𝐼&,* + 𝛽0𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽3𝐷∆𝑁𝐼&,* ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& 	+ 𝛽5∆𝑁𝐼&,* ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& +𝛽"𝐷∆𝑁𝐼&,* ∗ ∆𝑁𝐼&,* ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝜀&	 (1) 
Variables Coefficient t-value 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 0.066 9.91*** 𝐷∆𝑁𝐼 -0.008 -0.85 ∆𝑁𝐼 -1.262 -106.41*** 𝐷∆𝑁𝐼 ∗ ∆𝑁𝐼 1.254 84.15*** 𝑁𝐹𝐶 -0.064 -8.01*** 𝐷∆𝑁𝐼 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶 0.007 0.60 ∆𝑁𝐼 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶 1.073 37.85*** 𝑫∆𝑵𝑰 ∗ ∆𝑵𝑰 ∗ 𝑵𝑭𝑪 -1.400 -30.71*** 𝐹 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 1,653.76*** 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅- 0.521 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 10,650 
1) Refer to Table 2 for the definition of variables. 
2) ***, **, and * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5 shows the results of hypothesis testing with earnings persistence model of Basu (1997). Basu measured the 
degree of conservatism depending on how strong a relation between variations in the net losses during the previous 
term and during the current term is comparing with a relation between variations in the net earnings during the previous 
term and during the current term. He considered reflecting losses rather than earnings immediately as conservatism, 
and larger variations in the net losses than variations in the net earnings as a higher degree of conservatism. The 
coefficient 𝛽" of 𝐷∆𝑁𝐼 ∗ ∆𝑁𝐼 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶, which is the explanatory variable of this study, is a significant negative value. 
It explains that variations in the net losses of the corporations that do not raise capital is greater than variations in the 
net earnings. It indicates the corporations that do not raise capital are more conservative than corporations that raise 
capital. The explanatory power of the model is 52.1% and the F-value is significant. Regression analysis seems to be 
completed properly to verify this research hypothesis that is using earnings persistence model. 
 
 
Table 6. Regression Analysis by Stock Returns Model of Basu (1997) 𝑋𝑃& = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝐷𝑅& + 𝛽-𝑅𝐸𝑇& + 𝛽.𝐷𝑅& ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇& + 𝛽0𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽3𝐷𝑅& ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑇& ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& 	+ 𝛽"𝐷𝑅& ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇& ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝜀& (2) 
Variables Coefficient t-value 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 -0.059 -25.72*** 𝐷𝑅 0.062 13.74*** 𝑅𝐸𝑇 0.076 106.16*** 𝐷𝑅 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇 -0.057 -5.32*** 𝑁𝐹𝐶 0.060 21.08*** 𝐷𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶 -0.062 -11.55*** 𝑅𝐸𝑇 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶 -0.074 -42.30*** 𝑫𝑹 ∗ 𝑹𝑬𝑻 ∗ 𝑵𝑭𝑪 0.058 4.60*** 𝐹 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 1,614.99*** 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅- 0.515 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 10,650 
1) Refer to Table 3 for the definition of variables. 
2) ***, **, and * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6 shows the results of hypothesis testing with stock returns model of Basu (1997). Basu stated conservatism to 
recognize the bad news immediately and not to recognize the good news until it is realized. Stock returns would 
decrease if losses due to bad news are reflected immediately. Consequently, a negative stock returns would be more 
closely correlated with net earnings than a positive stock returns. The coefficient 𝛽" of 𝐷𝑅 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶, which is the 
explanatory variable of this study, is a significant positive value. It indicates that corporations that do not raise capital 
are more conservative than corporations that raise capital. The explanatory power of the model is 51.5% and the F-
value is significant.  
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Table 7. Regression Analysis by Givoly and Hayn Model (2000) 𝐺𝐻𝐴𝐶& = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽-𝐺𝐻𝐴𝐶&,* + 𝛽.𝑂𝐶𝐹& + 𝛽0𝐿𝐸𝑉& + 𝛽3𝑀𝑉& + 𝛽5𝐵𝑀& + 𝜀& (3) 
Variables Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.020 -0.77 
NFC  -0.013 -2.50** 
GHAC  -0.108 -12.30*** 
OCF  -0.326 -13.04*** 
LEV  -0.106 -12.13*** 
MV  0.003 1.92* 
BM  0.004 5.45*** 
F-value  78.85*** 
Adj.R2  0.043 
Sample size  10,650 
1) Refer to Table 3 for the definition of variables. 
2) ***, **, and * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7 shows the results of hypothesis testing with Givoly and Hayn (2000) model. Givoly and Hayn (2000) measured 
conservatism by using non-operating accruals. The coefficient 𝛽* of 𝑁𝐹𝐶, which is the explanatory variable of this 
study, is a significant negative value. It indicates that corporations that do not raise capital are more conservative than 
corporations that raise capital. The explanatory power of the model is 4.3% and the F-value is significant.  
 
 
Table 8. Regression Analysis by Ball and Shivakumar Model (2008) 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶& = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑂𝐶𝐹& + 𝛽-𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐹& + 𝛽.𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽0𝑂𝐶𝐹& ∗ 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐹& + 𝛽3𝑂𝐶𝐹& ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽5𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐹& ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& +𝛽"𝑂𝐶𝐹& ∗ 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐹& ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽`𝐺𝑊& + 𝛽b𝑃𝑃𝐸& + 𝜀& (4) 
Variables Coefficient t-value 
Intercept  0.015 1.65* 
OCF -0.294 -3.21*** 
DOCF -0.077 -6.09*** 
NFC  0.017 1.63 
OCF*DOCF  -1.077 -10.12*** 
OCF*NFC -0.318 -3.14*** 
DOCF*NFC  0.103 6.43*** 
OCF*DOCF*NFC 1.862 12.09*** 
GW 0.008 1.72* 
PPE  -12.726 -17.13*** 
F-value  133.49*** 
Adj.R2  0.101 
Sample size  10,650 
1) Refer to Table 3 for the definition of variables. 
2) ***, **, and * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 8 shows the results of hypothesis testing with Ball and Shivakumar (2008) model. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) 
examined the degree of conservatism by analyzing the relationship between total accruals and operating cash flows. 
The relationship between the two is determined by how the good news or the bad news is recognized in operating cash 
flows. When profits and losses are asymmetrically recognized and the bad news cause losses, the relation of total 
accruals and operating cash flows is positive, which suggests conservatism. The coefficient 𝛽" of 𝑂𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐹 ∗𝑁𝐹𝐶, which is the explanatory variable of this study, is a significant positive value. It indicates that corporations that 
do not raise capital are more conservative than corporations that raise capital. The explanatory power of the model is 
10.1% and the F-value is significant.  
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Table 9. Regression Analysis by Khan and Watts Model (2009) 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸& = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑁𝐹𝐶& + 𝛽-𝑀𝑉& + 𝛽.𝐿𝐸𝑉& + 𝛽0𝑂𝐶𝐹& + 𝛽3𝑀𝐵& + 𝛽5𝐺𝑊& + 𝛴𝑌𝐷 + 𝛴𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀& (5) 
Variables Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.095 -15.76*** 
NFC  0.004 4.48*** 
MV 0.005 17.01*** 
LEV 0.008 4.48*** 
OCF -0.006 -1.59 
MB -0.001 -4.41*** 
GW 0.001 1.07 
YD included 
IND included 
F-value 154.74*** 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅- 0.394 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 10,650 
1) Refer to Table 3 for the definition of variables. 
2) ***, **, and * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 9 shows the results of hypothesis testing with Khan and Watts (2009) model. Khan and Watts expanded stock 
returns model of Basu (1997) to develop a conservatism measure, called CSCORE. If CSCORE is higher, conservatism 
is stronger. The coefficient 𝛽* of 𝑁𝐹𝐶, which is the explanatory variable of this study, is a significant positive value. 
It indicates that corporations that do not raise capital are more conservative than corporations that raise capital. The 
explanatory power of the model is 39.4% and the F-value is significant. 
 
The regression analysis for the above five models reveals the consistent results that non-capital raising corporations 
conduct conservative accounting more than capital raising corporations. Namely, the results from 1991 to 2014 
coincided with the hypothesis4. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study has analyzed accounting conservatism of corporations that raise capital by issuing equity or issuing bonds 
and those that do not. The capital-raising corporations have incentives to choose less conservative accounting in order 
to easily finance capital, reduce costs of capital, or prolong conditions of contracts such as debt contracts. On the 
contrary, they would decide to conduct conservative accounting to cut the agency costs due to information asymmetry. 
The evidence this study provided reveals that among the Korean listed companies, those that raise capital carry out 
less conservative accounting than those that do not. The academic contribution of this paper is to verify the accounting 
conservatism of capital-raising corporations. Although there have been many studies on the accounting conservatism, 
there are no studies that have clarified the accounting conservatism of capital-raising corporations. The practical 
contributions of this paper are as follows. First, for external audits of capital-raising corporations, auditors need to 
examine thoroughly in case they conduct less conservative accounting. Second, regulators should consider to 
strengthen regulations and thoroughly supervise the financial reporting of capital-raising corporations. Third, investors 
should be more careful when investing in stocks or bonds considering that the numbers in the financial statements of 
the company may not be conservative. The limitation is that it does not include bank loan financing companies since 
the data was unobtainable. It would be meaningful if this paper can be extended in the following study to compare 
accounting conservatism differences between stock issuers and bond issuers. 
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